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OVERVIEW.I .
A. The government has adopted the position, in litigation
and in the administration bill to amend CERCLA,
that review of decisions for CERCLA remedial actions
is confined to the administrative record.
1. Government view: United States' Supplemental
Reply Memorandum in United States v. Occidental 
Chemical Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D. N.Y.).
2. Opposing view: Defendants' Joint Memorandum
in United States v. AVX Corp., No. 83-3882-Y 
(D. Mass.).
3. See United States v. Ward, No. 83-63-CIV-5 
(E.D. N.C., Sept. 9, 1985); Lone Pine Steering 
Comm, v. United States, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 
1985).
B. The CERCLA procedure for remedial actions.
1. The lengthy procedure leading to selection
of remedial action is set out in the National 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan
1
("NCP"), 50 Fed. Reg. 47912 (November 20, 
1985); see 40 C.F.R. §300.68.
a. The first stage is the preliminary 
Assessment/Site Investigation ("PA/SI"), 
a quick look at the site.
(i) §300.64
b. Next, the site is proposed to be placed 
on the National Priorities List ("NPL"); 
proposal is accompanied by opportunity 
for comment.
(i) §300.66
c. The site is then listed on the NPL.
(i) §300.66
(ii) See Eagle-Pitcher Industries v. EPA, 
759 F .2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(consolidated industry challenge
to the original NPL).
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Next, the government or private parties 
prepare a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility 
Study ("RI/FS") - a comprehensive site 
analysis and evaluation of alternative 
remedial actions.
(i) §300.68(d)
(ii) Note: The RI/FS can and often does
precede NPL promulgation.
EPA then allows informal comment on RI/FS, 
and a public meeting; public comment is 
usually restricted to three weeks.
(i) §300.67
EPA's selection of the "cost-effective" 
remedial action is embodied in the Record 
of Decision ("ROD") and accompanying staff 
analyses.
(i) §300.68 (i)
The ROD allows EPA to commit Superfund 
monies to take remedial action.
(i) §300.68 (j); CERCLA §104
h. The government can then commence a
cost-recovery action against potentially 
responsible parties ("PRP's") to recoup 
Superfund expenditures.
(i) CERCLA §107
(ii) This is the stage at which the court 
reviews the merits of the remedial 
action, to determine whether the 
remedial action was consistent with 
the NCP. The courts have rejected
(
PRPs' attempts to get review of EPA
j
decisions prior to government initiatdh 
of a cost-recovery action. E.g., j
J
Lone-Pine Steering Comm, v. United *| 
States, supra.
II. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS: REVIEW ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD. 
(WHAT IS IN THE RECORD? HOW IS IT COMPILED? WHAT IS 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW?)
A. Review confined to materials before decision maker 
at time he made decision.
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1. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U .S. 402 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U .S.
138 (1973); EPF v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
2. Thus, accepting the government's view, review 
would be confined to the ROD and the back-up 
materials, including the RI/FS and public 
comments.
B. The heart of the government's position is its desire
to avail itself of the favorable arbitrary or capricious 
standard of review.
1. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Sierra Club 
v. EPA, 540 F .2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
a. Review would not be under the substantial 
evidence test.
(i) See Judge Friendly's opinion in
Automobile Club of N.Y., Inc., v .
Cox, 592 F .2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979),
comparing the arbitrary or capricious 
and substantial evidence tests.
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b. Not preponderance of evidence test.
(i) American Paper Institute v. American 
Electric Power Service Corp., 103 
S.Ct. 1921 (1983) .
c. Not trial de novo.
(i) Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 
1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978) .
d. Thus, the government would not have to 
show its decision is the best, only that 
it was based on the record and not in 
contravention of law or policy.
(i) Small-Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task 
Force (11SRTF11) v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506 
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
C. Deference to decision maker.
1. On matters of legal interpretation.
a. Chevron U.S.A., Inc, v. NRDC, 104 S.Ct. 
2778 (1984) .
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b. On technical and factual matters, deference
is greatest under the arbitrary or capricious 
standard.
(i) SRTF v. EPA, supra.
D. Procedure.
1. The government will likely certify the record 
to the court.
a. Cf. Fed.R.App.P. 16, 17.
2. Much like a summary judgment procedure;
government will argue review based on evidence 
in the record.
E. Questions of permissible level of discovery.
1. There are tight restrictions on probing the 
mental processes of the decision maker under 
the arbitrary or capricious standard.
(i) Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.l (1 9 3 8 ) ; 
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 
(1 9 4 1) .
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2 . Alternatives are interviews with government 
employees, or
3. Possible use of Fed.R.Civ.P. 27 to perpetuate 
testimony. .
F. There are limited circumstances in which the reviewing 
court will look beyond the administrative record.
1. See S. Stark & S. Wald, "Setting No Records:
The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in 
Review of Administrative Action," 36 Ad.L.Rev.
333 (1984) .
a. For example, courts may take testimony 
in light of failure to explain agency 
action adequately, failure to consider 
or document consideration of relevant 
factors, bias and prejudgment.
b. Also, discovery generally is allowed to 
determine scope of the record.
(i) See, e .g ., NRDC v. Train, 519 F .2d 
28:7 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs 
in the district were "entitled to
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an opportunity to determine, by 
limited discovery, whether any other 
documents which are properly part 
of the administrative record have 
been withheld.")
G. Bear in mind that district courts, unlike courts 
of appeal, are generally unfamiliar with record 
review. This suggests opportunities to expand the 
record.
III. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.
A. Record review is a double-edged sword.
1. The corollary of record review is that the 
government's record must support its action.
2. The private parties have opportunities to help 
shape a favorable record, and to take advantage 
of favorable gaps in the record.
B. Keep up with the government.
1. Use of Freedom of Information Act, broadly and 
often, and challenge withholding of relevant 
documents.
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2. Attempt to compel the government to use 
a docket system.
a. Cf. Clean Air Act §307 (d) .
b. There is an added appearance of 
arbitrariness and procedural sloppiness 
if the government refuses.
C. Memorialize all favorable communications and 
positions in writing.
1. Helps ito shape a favorable record.
2. Artful use of the nBook-of-the-Month-Club" 
response ("If we do not hear from you, we 
assume you agree with us.").
D. Take full advantage of every opportunity to 
comment.
1. PA/SI (EPA may refuse to consider these 
comments - see point III. E., infra).
2. NPL proposal.
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3. RI/FS.
4. Use of creative administrative practice,
e.g., petition for reconsideration of Record 
of Decision, particularly when the PRP's 
have a well-documented, less expensive 
alternative remedial plan.
E. Force the government to respond to your comments.
1. And, document when they do not, to lay 
foundation for later challenge.
F. Make sure the government's record contains what
you want.
1. Constant monitoring and supplementing of 
record.
2. Avoid a judicial dispute on scope of record —  
it is far better to get your documents in
up front than to argue their relevance 
after-the-fact.
G. Watch for possible bias and prejudgment.
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1 . Particularly at stages of site listing, 
remedy selection.
2. State and federal governments are under 
pressure to tell public what they will do, 
and they often get ahead of the process.
3. Failure of government to document ex parte 
contacts.
H. Organize PRP effort for maximum impact.
IV. MOUNTING THE SUCCESSFUL LEGAL CHALLENGE.
A. Substantive challenges.
1. Lack of record support for the selected 
remedy.
a . Greater Boston Television Corp. v .
FCC, 444 F .2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 
cert, denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
2. Government's failure to take account of 
contrary positions.
- 1 2 -
ASARCO v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
1980); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
3. Government's failure to adhere to NCP, its 
own guidance policies and procedures; 
including sampling and analysis techniques.
a. See "Violations By Agencies of Their 
Own Regulations," 87 Harv. L. Rev.
629 (1974).
4. But beware possible bars on challenging 
underlying models —  Eagle-Pitcher, supra.
a. Thus, important to maintain distinction 
between challenging model or policy 
itself, and challenging application
of the model or policy. Latter may 
be allowed, former may not. Eagle-Pitcher, 
supra.
b. And, may be able to challenge policy 
indirectly, e.g., challenge to failure
- 1 3 -
to delete site from NPL as way of 
challenging EPA policy of requiring 
full RI/FS even when remediation 
complete before listing.
5. Use of administrative stare decisis -- EPA 
collects and may be publishing its RODS.
EPA has an obligation to follow its 
administrative precedents, or to explain 
its deviations. The potential for inconsistent 
agency decisions increases as RODs are delegated 
to Regional Administrators.
B. Procedural challenges.
1. Inadequate opportunity for public comment, 
especially when the government relies on 
llth-hour documents.
a. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) .
2. Failure to document ex parte contacts, 
a. Sierra Club v. Costle, supra.
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3. Final action that departs significantly 
from "proposed" action —  the "logical 
outgrowth" test.
a. SRTF v. EPA, supra.
4. Failure to consider full range of practicable 
alternatives to selected remedial action.
a. See, generally, the cases arising 
under Section 102 of the National 
Environmental Policy Act., e .g. , Druid 
Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc v. FHWA, 23 
E.R.C. 1663 (11th Cir. 1985).
C. Due process considerations.
1. See, generally, the arguments advanced
in Defendants' Joint Memorandum in United 
States v. AVX Corp., supra.
a. Lack of meaningful notice and opportunity 
for comment.
b. Lack of hearing (opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses) 
at any stage.
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c. Lack of pre-enforcement review, and 
the "sufficient cause" defense.
(i) Wagner Electric Corp., supra, 
and cases cited therein.
d. Also, the government's position that 
previously promulgated models and 
policies are immune from review raises 
due process concerns.
(i) Adamo Wrecking Co. v. EPA, 434 
U.S. 275 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring).
e. For another approach, compare the 
procedures used by the Corps of 
Engineers under Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act.
(i) Moretti v. Hoffman, 526 F.2d 
1311 (5th Cir. 1976); Buttrey 
v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170 
(5th Cir. 1982) .
D. Uncertain effect of a government loss.
- 1 6 -
1. Inappropriateness of the typical remand 
order, when remedial work is already done.
2. Trial de novo, or outright loss by government.
V. POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF RECORD REVIEW FOR OTHER CERCLA 
ACTIONS.
A. Removal actions.
B. Enforcement actions under §106.
1. Wagner Electric Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F.Supp. 
736 (D.Kan. 1985) .
VI. POSSIBLE CERCLA AMENDMENTS —  LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION 
OF GOVERNMENT POSITION.
A. H.R. 2817 would require EPA to establish an 
administrative record and would impose the 
arbitrary or capricious standard of review.
The Senate bill has no similar provision.
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Settlement Policy Summary
The government published its "Interim CERCLA 
Settlement Policy" on November 29, 1984. Although billed 
only as guidance for analyzing settlement proposals in 
superfund cases, the ten sections of the policy actually set 
forth the overall enforcement philosophy for the superfund 
program. The policy is an attempt to distill the 
government's collective experience in the litigation and 
settlement of superfund cases in order to advise affected 
parties of the course it will follow in selecting cases for 
prosecution, targeting parties as defendants, conducting 
negotiations and evaluating settlement proposals. The policy 
is important both as an expression of new concepts as well as 
a formal statement of operating principles. For example, the 
government's unequivocal statement of its willingness to 
consider and accept settlement proposals of less than 100% of 
cleanup is an important public clarification of its position. 
Similarly, the removal of the requirement that potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs) be willing to undertake or pay for 
80% of cleanup as a condition precedent to negotiation
has been deleted from the initial draft of the policy. This 
is an important initiative intended to spur settlement 
proposals.
Underlying the policy is an intention to vest more 
authority and flexibility in the conduct of negotiations and 
the evaluation of settlement proposals in regional EPA 
offices. The evaluative criteria are subjective. As a 
result, line personnel will be the most influential in making 
the case specific, factual determinations that will 
ultimately drive the decision making process.
The policy can be broken into five main parts:
1. Enforcement philosophy (Section I)
2. Litigation priorities and defendant selection 
(Section VIII)
3. Information release policy (Section III)
4. Settlement evaluation guidelines (Sections II, IV, 
V, IX and X)
5. Scope of release and contribution (Sections VI and
VII)
1 . Enforcement Philosophy
Section I of the policy reaffirms EPA's enforcement 
resolve while recognizing the need for negotiated settle­
ments. The policy outlines an agency enforcement philosophy, 
the goal of which is to recover all costs of cleanup. Yet it 
also recognizes the 100% goal is unobtainable in every case. 
This acknowledgement of the relevancy of such real world 
considerations as case equity, party culpability, limited 
resources and fund availability provides a rationale for the 
government to settle for less than 100% of cleanup after a 
rigorous, internal review of delineated, case specific 
factors. The policy is designed to allow the government 
flexibility to take less than a 100% clean-up without 
appearing to have abrogated its enforcement responsibilities.
The approach set out in the settlement policy is 
bottomed on the government's substantial success in obtaining 
more than $400 million in private party clean-up and its fear 
that anything less than a "100%, clean it to background" 
policy will appear to be a signal that the agency has 
lessened its reliance on enforcement as a method of obtaining 
cleanup. Thus, in Part I the agency restates its basic 
superfund enforcement tenants, tempered by its experience and 




strict liability standard in Section 106 and 107 of 
CERCLA which is joint and several in scope 
importance of negotiated private party clean-up as 
necessary adjunct to fund financed and litigation 
induced clean-up
pursuit of parties in litigation who refuse to 
negotiate or cooperate with government 
use of the fund to supplement less than 100% 
settlements
relaxed information exchange requirements to 
facilitate negotiations
removal of the arbitrary 80% rule as condition 
precedent to negotiation.
The government’s enforcement philosophy is: 
negotiated settlements whenever possible, litigation as 
necessary; flexibility and increased delegation of authority 
to regional offices, albeit with overriding authority in EPA 
headquarters.
2. Litigation Priorities and Defendant Selection (Part 
VIII)
This section of the policy is remarkable for its 
open direction to government enforcement personnel to select 
cases on the basis of merit. The factors enumerated for use 
in case selection are:
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substantial environmental problem
significant amounts of money involved
good factual and legal basis for establishing
liability
solvent defendant
statute of limitations problems (here the 
government carefully avoids stating what it 
believes to be the applicable statute of 
limitation. A good argument can be made for the 
statute’s running either 3 or 6 years from cleanup 
completion. Less persuasive arguments exist for a 
two year statute or the statute's running from 
initiation of cleanup. In the first case to 
address the issue, United States v. Mottolo, Civil
No. 83-547D ____ F .Supp. ____ (D.N.H., March 15,
1985), the Court held the statute of limitations 
for actions against the fund for natural resources 
damages under Section 111 and 112 to be 3 years. 
The Court held there was no statute of limitations 
for Section 107 response actions.
While stopping short of articulating an absolute rule, the 
policy establishes priorities for case development and 
prosecution:
107 actions where all costs have been incurred
-5-
106 actions at sites not subject to fund cleanup 
106/107 combinations where money has been spent, 
identified injunctive relief is needed and the fund 
is unavailable.
Implicitly, the policy instructs regional offices 
to refer for litigation well-developed cases against solvent 
defendants at sites presenting significant environmental 
problems and fund financed cleanup is either completed or 
will never begin. The genesis of this section is EPA's fear 
that numerous small cases will drain available resources, 
making it impossible to successfully prosecute major cases. 
Parties who desire to know which cases are targeted for 
enforcement or cleanup should consult the Site Management 
Plan (SMP) compiled by and maintained in the Region where an 
NPL site is located. The SMP gives a preview of site 
activity (RI-FS, RD, etc.) and allocation of funds for work 
increments on a quarter-by-quarter basis for each fiscal 
year. Availability of funds (both federal and state share), 
political and public health considerations will drive 
enforcement/fund lead determinations at most sites. The 
agency's experience in Section 106 cases - good results but 
big resource investment - has resulted in a reluctance to 
seek cleanup through injunctive litigation except in the 
absence of other alternatives.
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This section also discusses the way the government 
chooses defendants. Relying on joint and several liability, 
the government attempts to maximize its litigative 
convenience, choosing defendants for the following reasons:
site owners and operators almost always sued
- largest manageable number of parties, primarily 
based on volume, toxicity and financial viability. 
The government is looking for the best case against 
the smallest number of solvent defendants. Volume 
is the most important consideration in choosing a 
defendant. Toxicity comes into play as a deter­
minative factor primarily with generators who might 
not otherwise be joined as defendants due to the 
small volume of waste for which they are 
responsible
- recalcitrance or other equitable factors relating 
to cooperation with the government. Recalcitrance 
can virtually insure inclusion, past favorable 
action does not generally enable PRPs to avoid 
suit.
The policy states that the agency will consider not 
suing companies which have settled with the government in the 
first phase of a multi-phased cleanup. It creates the 
impression that the government may sue non-settlers, pursuing 
the settling parties only as a last resort for any
-7-
deficiency. To date, the government has not exhibited much 
willingness to follow this approach. The success of the 
settlement policy may turn on whether the government will in 
fact do so. Unless PRPs can realize an advantage by 
voluntary cooperation with the government, no incentive to 
early cooperation is created. As discussed below, this 
provision, together with the policy on releases from 
liability, is critically important to the government's 
successful implementation of the settlement policy.
3. Information Release Policy
The government's perceived and actual unwillingness 
to provide PRPs with basic information about the identity and 
number of contributors, type of substances, and percentage of 
total contribution at sites has been a major source of 
complaint by private parties. The absence of this 
information made efforts to coalesce PRPs in order to 
formulate settlement proposals and allocate costs extremely 
difficult. The settlement policy provides that this summary 
information will now generally be made available unless 
countervailing confidentiality or litigation considerations 
predominate. The agency will utilize all its information 
gathering authority under RCRA and CERCLA to collect 
information from PRPs. See, in this regard, United States v. 
Liviola, ___ F.Supp. ___ (N.D. Ohio 1985). However, the
agency need not receive the information it seeks from PRPs
prior to its release of information to them, only within a 
reasonable time.
4. Settlement Evaluation Guidelines (Parts II, IV, V, IX 
and X)
These parts of the policy describe the procedure 
and substantive analysis EPA will follow in evaluating 
settlement proposals. In summary, the policy provides:
a. minimum threshold for negotiation (Part II):
"No specific numerical threshold for initiating negotiations 
has been established." The policy requires only that PRPs 
represent a "substantial portion" of the cleanup costs/work 
to begin negotiation. This represents a major change from 
the previous requirement that 80% of cleanup costs or work be 
guaranteed as a condition precedent to negotiations.
b . partial settlements are acceptable: The
government will accept settlement offers of less than 100% of 
costs or cleanup. This is among most important policy 
statements contained in the settlement policy. If flexibility 
does not result from the government's implementation of the 
policy, a litigative log jam be created. Procedurally, EPA 
staff must prepare a case evaluation prior to initiating 
negotiations which will be reviewed by EPA headquarters for 
national consistency and issues of policy or legal precedent.
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The evaluation must consider the settlements criteria set out 
in Part IV of the policy.
The policy identifies three general categories of 
cases which may be appropriate for partial settlement:
i cases where evaluation using Part IV 
settlement criteria justify settlement for 
less than 100%. Typically, these cases will 
turn on factual and legal strengths and 
weaknesses.
ii cases "where the unwillingness of a relatively 
small group parties to settle prevents the 
development of a proposal for a substantial 
portion of costs or the remedy." The purpose 
here is to isolate and punish recalcitrant 
PRPs and reward those who cooperate in 
achieving settlements.
iii cases which regardless of their strength or 
weakness are too small to warrant all out 
litigation. These include:
administrative settlements where total 
cleanup costs are less than $200,000 
claims in bankruptcy
de minimis contributors. Although the 
meaning of de minimis is unclear, it 
generally refers to volume. Toxicity is
-10-
a secondary factor, but high volume, low 
toxicity wastes are unlikely to be an 
acceptable candidate for settlement as a 
de minimis generator. Moreover, the de 
minimis provision may be illusory.
Because the law of release and the 
respective rights among jointly liable 
PRPs is unclear, the government may view 
settlement as too dangerous to its 
remaining rights against other PRPs to 
entertain.
c. Partial (phased) Cleanup (Part V): The govern­
ment is willing to enter into agreements for a phase of an 
entire cleanup (as distinguished from less than 100% of the 
cost of cleanup described above). Thus, EPA will consider 
offers to undertake surface cleanup or other planned 
removals. However, EPA still will not as a general rule, 
allow PRPs to undertake only an RI-FS. The prevailing view 
within EPA remains that negotiating about the RI-FS is too 
resource intensive and results in delay which could otherwise 
be spent cleaning up the site. Rather, EPA finds it less 
expensive and more efficient to undertake the RI-FS itself. 
However, current EPA guidance allows participation by PRPs in 
the RI-FS process. See EPA Guidance Document "Participation 
of Potentially Responsible Parties in RIFS Development"
-11-
(3/20/84). More guidance in performing RI-FS is expected to 
be published by EPA in the near future.
The phased settlement approach has been utilized by 
EPA with success. In many cases, the approach to source 
control may be obvious - e.g. removal and capping - whereas 
the selection of further remedial action is unknown or 
requires additional study. The agency has regularly left 
the question of ultimate remedy open to further negotiation 
or litigation in exchange for performance of the initial 
phase of cleanup by PRPs. So long as PRPs can accept the 
open-ended nature of this contingent liability, this approach 
will undoubtedly continue to be acceptable to EPA. Phased 
settlements involving source control may well be to the 
advantage of all concerned. First, it removes the hazard 
reducing the continuing contamination and, presumably, the 
cost of ground water cleanup. Second, it enables EPA to act 
on other, more immediate problems. Finally, it builds 
equities for PRPs with the governmental agencies, the courts 
and the public.
A difficult, unsettled question is whether EPA will 
settle for less than 100% of a particular phase of cleanup. 
The agency agreed to do so in early settlements - Chem-Dyne, 
South Caroline Recycling Disposal Inc. (SCRDI) - but the 
current attitude toward them is unclear. One advantage to 
the government in accepting phased settlements is avoiding
-12-
litigative costs and conserving the fund for other projects.
To the extent the government must continue litigation or 
undertake fund financed cleanup at a site, the advantage to 
accepting less than 100% of a phase of cleanup is marginal. 
Factors such as the government’s desire to perform the work 
itself to insure its adequacy, particularly at sites which 
are technically complex or have a high public profile, may 
militate in favor of such settlements.
d. timing of negotiations (Part IX): EPA is 
attempting to limit negotiations for private party cleanup to 
60 days after completion of the RI-FS and the Negotiating 
Decision Document (NDD) which identifies EPA's chosen remedy. 
The NDD is the "bottom line" for the government in 
negotiations. In fact, EPA regularly extends the deadline so 
long as there is demonstratable progress in negotiations.
The sixty day rule is a reminder to PRPs and government alike 
that the negotiation process must produce results.
Otherwise, litigation or cleanup activity will be commenced. 
Due to resource constraints, the government no less than PRPs 
desires to avoid litigation which is uncertain and expensive. 
Therefore, even incremental progress is generally enough to 
keep negotiations going and stall litigation.
e. settlement criteria (Part IV): Part IV of the 
policy contains the ten settlement criteria the government 
will employ in evaluating settlement proposals. They express
-13-
the government's recognition that while uniformity is 
desirable, settlement decisions must be based on real world 
consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
cases. Included in this calculus is the government's acute 
awareness of the resource constraints it faces in conducting 
litigation at each site. Thus, the government is forced to 
choose to litigate fully only a few cases. In so doing, it 
must balance the cost-benefit of litigation: the amount of
cleanup or costs recovered against the cost of obtaining it, 
the public health implications of delay in cleanup pending 
litigation and the backlog of other cases which require 
resolution. Viewed in this light, the government is under 
enormous pressure to settle for the best cleanup it can 
achieve as quickly as possible.
The ten criteria are:
1. Volume of wastes contributed to site by each
PRP. This is the most important consideration 
to the government and PRPs in evaluating 
settlements and allocating liability for 
cleanup costs. Toxicity is a factor, but 
volume is the real measuring stick in 
determining whether an offer is acceptable. 
Assuming the government can meet its burden of 
proof under superfund, PRPs should not 
generally expect to be able to settle for less 
than their percentage share by volume of
-14-
wastes at a site. Indeed, the government will 
seek a premium to settle all liability. 
Typically, utilizing a joint and several 
liability theory, the government sues or 
negotiates with PRPs representing less than 
100% of waste by volume and expects them to 
pay 100% or close to it. The government 
leaves it to the settlers to obtain the 
overage from PRPs with whom the government has 
not negotiated or joined as a party. Thus, in 
structuring a settlement offer, PRPs must be 
able to demonstrate that more than a "fair 
share" by volume is represented. The exact 
amount will obviously depend on the strength 
of the government's case and the difficulty 
the government will have in presenting its 
case in court. The government has declined to 
act as a policeman of allocation formulae and 
seldom has looked behind a group's offer to 
evaluate its adequacy as to individual parti­
cipation. The government's view, based in 
large part on resource constraints, is that 
allocation is a function best left to PRPs.
2. Nature of the wastes contributed. The
government will consider toxicity in evalua­
ting a settlement. Based on past history, 
volume is a base line for cost allocation.
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Thus, toxicity is utilized primarily to 
increase the amount of money the government 
will accept in settlement from a low or medium 
volume generator of a highly toxic waste. 
Mobility, persistence and exacerbated 
difficulty in cleanup attributable to 
particular wastes are also considered by EPA. 
The presence of a low volume high toxicity 
waste can make settlement difficult if that 
generator is not part of the settling group. 
EPA may be reluctant to settle with high 
volume PRPs which leaves a case primarily 
against a low volume defendant who will argue 
that disproportionate cost allocation is 
inappropriate. EPA's willingness to take the 
litigation risk associated with that type of 
settlement will be a bellweather for its 
sincerety in utilizing the settlement policy.
3. Strength of evidence tracing the wastes at the 
site to the settling parties. EPA must prove 
that a PRP's wastes have been sent to and were 
present at a site to establish liability under 
CERCLA. The government claims it will adjust 
its willingness to accept less than 100% of 
cleanup in direct proportion to the strength 
or weakness of its evidence connecting PRP to 
the site. In practice, the government has not
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shown a general willingness to consider the 
circumstances of single PRPs where there are 
multiple parties. Thus, a PRP may not be able 
to settle with the government until a group 
offer is made and substantial cost for attor­
ney and consulting fees incurred. As with the 
de minimis contributor, unless EPA will 
evaluate a PRP's claim of weak evidence, this 
factor may be of little aid to anyone other 
than the government or a group of PRPs in 
making or evaluating a comprehensive settle­
ment proposal.
4. Ability of the settling parties to pay.
Insolvency or limited assets are factors to be 
considered. The government does not intend to 
waste its resources against a party who cannot 
satisfy a judgment. Installment payments and 
other alternatives to lump sum payment are 
authorized. The government has not shown a 
predilection to allow parties to make demon­
strations of limited financial capacity. 
Moreover, the government applies a stringent 
test which essentially turns on whether a 
defendant would become bankrupt if forced to 
pay 100%. PRPs should be prepared to offer 
documentation of insolvency and accept an 
onerous pay out schedule (both as to amount
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and time) to obtain less than 100% settlement 
on financial capacity grounds.
5. Litigative risks in proceeding to trial. This 
section reiterates the admonition about good 
quality evidence contained in #3, adding 
requirements of admissability and adequacy. A 
third factor - availability of defenses under 
Section 107(b) - is also considered. The 
shortness of this section belies its 
importance. In fact, the government is most 
vulnerable in the area of the quality and 
quantity of evidence. Particular problems 
which should be explored by PRPs include: 
Maintenance of appropriate chain of 
custody. The number of people involved 
in sampling and analysis makes proof 
difficult and onerous for the government. 
Maintenance of required testing and other 
scientific procedures and protocols. EPA 
labs often do not comply with their own 
testing protocols.
Availability and quality of cost 
documentation. The Agency has had great 
difficulties in the timely and complete 
collection of cost documents in superfund 
cases. As with lab samples, chain of 
custody is a problem for the government
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given quality assurance/quality control 
problems and the number of persons who 
may be needed to authenticate and make 
the records admissable. Where state 
costs are involved, the problems of proof 
are magnified. The government is well 
aware of the evidentiary problems it 
faces in the proof of its superfund 
cases. PRPs should always request cost 
documentation (not just summaries) from 
the government prior to entering into 
settlement in cost recovery cases.
EPA will evaluate Section 107(b)(3) 
defenses in determining the worth of its 
case. As discussed elsewhere, the 
defenses are restrictive.
Act of God, act of war, solely caused by 
third party - and analogous defenses 
under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act 
have been narrowly construed in favor of 
the government. As with almost all 
equity factors, the government's initial 
settlement position will not typically 
reflect any reduction for them. PRPs 
must ferret out and advocate them at the 
bargaining table.
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6 . Public interest considerations. This
section responds to the "Seymour" 
situation where the state cannot pay its 
matching share as required by 
§ 104(c)(3)(C) of CERCLA. It enables the 
government to balance the public interest 
in obtaining expeditious cleanup against 
the unavailability of federal funds. The 
government will undoubtedly limit the 
scope of this provision to justify 
settlement of less than 100% "only when 
there is a demonstrated need for a quick 
remedy to protect public health or the 
environment."
7. Precedential value. A restatement of 
government resolve for strong 
enforcement. This section actually is 
designed to be used more for rejecting 
what may be an otherwise acceptable 
settlement to establish good legal 
precedent. In fact, the government has 
not and will not turn down good 
settlements to make good law. Given the 
magnitude of the government's enforcement 
docket and the impetus for settlements, 
this provision will likely receive little 
use. More likely it will be used as a
"puffing" mechanism in negotiations to 
underscore the government's litigative 
resolve as a negotiating chip with PRPs.
8. Value of obtaining a sum certain. By 
using present value calculations the 
government will, in effect, discount 
settlements in current dollars which may 
not be payable for several years. Using 
a model developed for this purpose, the 
agency hopes to be able to encourage 
"cash out" settlements.
9. Inequities and aggravating factors. A 
general catchall for the use of equitable 
considerations. By its terms it would 
allow the government to consider such 
actions as voluntary removal by a PRP 
undertaken prior to the government’s 
request that it do so. However, so long 
as a 100% policy is pursued and the 
government is apprehensive that it will 
appear to be lax if it does not pursue 
all PRPs equally, this provision may only 
be used to enhance not decrease the 
amount the government will seek from 
PRPs.
10. Nature of the case that remains after 
settlement. The decision-makers want to
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know the nature of the remaining case, if 
any, that exists if the government 
accepts a settlement proposal. Factors 
include the solvency and culpability of 
the remaining PRPs, the quality of the 
evidence against them, the equity of 
proceeding for the remainder of cleanup 
against them, and the resource 
expenditure which the government must 
make to proceed against non-settlers.
These ten guidelines are in actuality an attempt to 
codify the application of common sense to the evaluation of 
settlement proposals. They serve several purposes at once. 
First, they inform PRPs of the factors utilized to evaluate 
their offer. Proposals should be structured to address the 
ten factors in recognition that the EPA staff personnel must 
justify the settlement to management personnel utilizing 
them. Second, they instruct EPA of the factors they must 
consider in evaluating settlement proposals. Regional staff 
have been delegated authority to make the subjective, 
factual, site specific determinations which will drive the 
decision-making process. PRPs should work closely and 
cooperatively with staff personnel to insure that the most 
favorable factual picture can be drawn which will bring a 
proposal within EPA's settlement criteria. As Part IX 
indicates, headquarters EPA and, in judicial cases, the
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Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice Land 
and Natural Resources Division, have final authority to 
approve settlements. The dynamics of the process are that 
regional personnel will become advocates for an acceptable 
proposal to the top decision-makers. The major factors 
considered by the managerial level in Washington are 1) 
recommendations of staff; 2) national consistency and 3) 
non-controversial nature of proposal. Initially, partial 
settlements will receive intense scrutiny, by EPA 
headquarters. However, the volume of case work and the 
pressure to successfully implement the settlement policy will 
make such close attention impossible in every case. As 
experience is gained, hopefully more deference will be given 
to the regional offices.
All judicial settlements receive close attention in 
Washington. Department of Justice regulations require that 
every filing and settlement of every superfund suit must be 
personally received and approved by the Assistant Attorney 
General of the Land and Natural Resources Division. Pursuant 
to a Memorandum of Understanding between EPA and the Depart­
ment, judicial case can be settled unless they jointly 
concur. Thus, administrative, non-judicial settlements are 
more quickly approved and consistency and legal precedent are 
less a factor than if the Department of Justice must concur. 
Finally, in establishing this elaborate process, EPA is 
attempting to demonstrate to Congress and the public that
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settlements will be evaluated on the basis of public health, 
environmental and resource considerations.
There is no magical formula for the utilization of 
the settlement criteria. The government staff will probably 
boil them down and balance 1) the strength of the case and 
likelihood of success, 2) the amount of money or extent of 
cleanup involved, and 3) the ability of the PRPs to pay, to 
arrive at a subjective evaluation of the value of the case. 
The success the government has had in court, coupled with 
criticism the program has received about laxity and delay 
have made settlement for less than 100% difficult at best. 
However, the number of cases which will arise under superfund 
and the resource intensity of them has forced the government 
to attempt to find a way to achieve settlements.
5. Release and Contribution (Part VI and VII). The issues 
of the scope of release and contribution may be the most 
controversial and troublesome for PRPs desiring to settle 
their superfund liability of the government. Understandably, 
PRPs believe that a full release is a necessary and appro­
priate incentive to settlement. However, the government has 
been unwilling, except in extraordinary circumstances, to 
give full releases from liability in superfund cases. The 
government believes that "(t)he need for finality in settle­
ments must be balanced against the need to insure that PRPs 
remain responsible for recurring endangerments and unknown
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conditions.” Put simply, the science of groundwater cleanup 
technology and human health and environmental effects is too 
uncertain for the government to release PRPs from all contin­
gent liability. The government fears that remedial measures 
may prove inadequate and lead to future endangerments or fund 
expenditures whether by reason of design or construction 
defects, unknown conditions or effectiveness of the remedy. 
Thus, the government believes this risk of future costs or 
endangerment should be borne by PRPs and not the superfund. 
This is the government's position both for cost recovery and 
injunctive cases, regardless of whether the government has 
approved the remedy.
The guidance contained in Part VII of the policy 
does not really portend a complete release from liability.
It is intended to explain the extent of release the 
government believes is possible. If any rule can be drawn 
from the policy it is that the expansiveness of the release 
is directly proportional to the known effectiveness and 
confidence level of the remedy. The policy is intended to 
force development of permanent remedial solutions such as 
inceneration and to be a disincentive to land disposal or 
containment remedies. In the government's view, the latter 
category virtually assures future remedial action will be 
required. The policy also favors off-site disposal.
However, given the vast number of non-complying RCRA disposal
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facilities, off-site disposal 
transference of an inevitable 
site to another.
is being viewed as mere 
environmental problem from one
The determination of effectiveness and thus the 
scope of release from future liability will obviously be 
factually bound and site specific. However, the government 
will seek consistency with a minimum set of future contingent 
liabilities. The policy states the general rule:
Regardless of the relative expansiveness or 
stringency of the release in other respects, at a 
minimum settlement documents must contain reopeners 
allowing the government to modify terms and 
conditions of the agreement for the following types 
of circumstances:
o where previously unknown or undetected con­
ditions that arise or are discovered at the 
site after the time of the Agreement may 
present an imminent and substantial endan- 
germent to public health, welfare or the 
envi ronment.
o where the Agency receives additional infor­
mation, which was not available at the time of 
the Agreement, concerning the scientific 
determinations on which the settlement was 
premised (for example, health effects 
associated with levels of exposure, toxicity 
of hazardous substances, and the 
appropriateness of the remedial technologies 
for conditions at the site) and this 
additional information indicates that site 
conditions may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the public health 
or welfare or the environment.
In addition, release clauses must not preclude the 
Government from recovering costs incurred in responding to
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the types of imminent and substantial endangerments 
identified above.
In addition to requiring the ability to reopen a 
settlement to seek more relief, the policy contains 
limitations on the timing and scope of release available. 
Ordinarily, releases are effective upon completion of the 
cleanup. "Cash out" settlements (so called because PRPs pay 
money before cleanup costs are incurred) are appropriate 
typically only when the government can reasonably ascertain 
the cost of cleanup and PRPs pay a "carefully calculated 
premium or other financial instrument" (typically a bond) 
"that adequately insures . . . against these uncertainties."
A bond was used in the Seymour, Berlin & Farro and A&F 
Materials cases. There are eight specifically stated 
limitations to the scope of release:
A release or covenant may be given only to the PRP 
providing the consideration for the release.
The release or covenant must not cover any claims 
other than those involved in the case.
- The release must not address any criminal matter.
- Releases for partial cleanups that do not extend to 
the entire site must be limited to the work 
actually completed.
Federal claims for natural resource damages should 
not be released without the approval of Federal 
trustees.
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Responsible parties must release any related claims 
against the United States, including the Hazardous 
Substances Response Fund.
Where the cleanup is to be performed by the PRPs, 
the release or covenant should normally become 
effective only upon the completion of the cleanup 
(or phase of cleanup) in a manner satisfactory to 
EPA.
Release clauses should be drafted as covenants not 
to sue, rather than releases from liability, where 
this form may be necessary to protect the legal 
rights of the Federal Government.
A ninth limitation is that a release may only extend to work 
actually done or paid for by a PRP.
As with most other parts of the settlement policy, 
the possibility exists for exceptions:
In extraordinary circumstances, it may be clear 
after application of the settlement criteria set 
out in Section IV that it is in the public interest 
to agree to a more limited or more expansive 
release not subject to the conditions outlined 
above. Concurrence of the Assistant Administrators 
for OSWER and OECM (and the Assistant Attorney 
General when the release is given on behalf of the 
United States) must be obtained before the 
Government's negotiating team is authorized to 
negotiate regarding such a release or covenant.
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This provision is designed to allow flexibility in situations 
where the relative strength of the government's case, the 
availability of superfund to do the cleanup or other similar 
compelling public interest is present. Thus, a Seymour type 
settlement - widely criticized when entered - could still 
occur if a compelling public interest justified it. Par­
ticularly in judicial consent decrees, the government has 
demonstrated limited flexibility in giving full releases from 
liability. In short, PRPs should expect to live with some 
uncertainty concerning future liability unless a complete, 
effective remediation program is guaranteed. In the Hyde 
Park case involving Occidental Petroleum in Niagra Falls, New 
York, a full release was given in exchange for a 
comprehensive, nearly open-ended program of remediation.
This case, it should be noted, was settled long before the 
advent of the settlement policy and the continued 
availability of such expansive language is open to question.
Related to the issue of release from liability is 
the government's willingness to provide contribution pro­
tection to settling PRPs. Obviously, settling parties wish 
to be insulated from third party suits should they settle 
with the government and the government pursue non-settling 
parties in litigation. Despite the policy's insistence that 
continued protection is available in limited situations, the 
United States has uniformly provided this protection in 
multipart settlements to date. The potential for additional
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liability for a settling PRP exists where the government 
settles with A, then sues B. If B is jointly liable with A, 
it may seek contribution from A in a third party suit. 
Normally, the government agrees to reduce any judgment it may 
obtain against a non-settler to the extent that judgment may 
be used as a basis for obtaining additional payments from the 
settling PRP.
The law of contribution and release is unsettled. 
The government argues, and some courts have held that a right 
of contribution exists under CERCLA. (Indeed, almost all 
proposed CERCLA reauthorization bills before Congress make 
such a right express in the statute.) The government con­
tends that contribution protection clauses are unnecessary 
because the stated intention of the parties in good faith 
settlements to terminate contribution rights will control the 
judicial construction of settlement agreements. It relies on 
the Uniform Joint Contribution Among Tortfeasors Statutes to 
reach this conclusion. The policy also commits the govern­
ment to support termination of contribution rights in 
litigation of non-settlers against settling PRPs. However, 
until the statute is amended or the law is settled in this 
area, PRPs should continue to demand such language in settle­
ment agreements.
The policy requires a written justification before 
the government may agree to contribution protection language.
The justification must consider: the policy states the
government will not provide indemnity nor pay money to adjust 
subsequent contribution claims. Finally, the government will 
seek to limit the rights of settling PRPs to pursue claims 
against non-settlers by requiring subordination of private 
claims for contribution to the government's claim. This has 
rarely been agreed to by settling PRPs and may be more often 
used as a bargaining chip than a non-negotiable demand.
Some commentators have questioned the value of a 
release from liability, given the contingent, open-ended 
nature of them. This is a fair comment, to which there is no 
complete governmental response. However, settlements achieve 
at least a temporary, and hopefully, permanent cessation of 
liability and focus the government's enforcement attention on 
non-settlers. Moreover, whatever reopener provisions may be 
contained in settlement agreements, the government will 
undoubtedly bear a difficult burden if it seeks additional 
relief unless it can show a strong likelihood that public 
health may be affected or that the remedial plan was 
improperly implemented. Where the government actually 
undertakes the remedy, that burden appears even more 
substantive. Nevertheless, the balance between public 
welfare and private interests will likely be tipped toward 
the government where real public health concerns can be 
demonstrated.
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